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RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
facts, decisions like Sleeman will "conform to a static logic" of stare
decisis, but they will fall short of "substantive justice."
RICHARD E. HAHN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION -
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
The freedom to move from state to state unimpeded by barriers is
a right most travelers within the United States take for granted. Oc-
casionally, however, state legislatures have employed subtle methods
to prevent people from entering their borders. Through the enact-
ment of statutory restrictions burdensome to those wishing to immi-
grate, states may discourage the entrance of unwelcome newcomers,
while avoiding the public censure which would be engendered by
more blatant forms of exclusion such as barbed wire or armed
guards. When challenged, such statutes have consistently been
struck down by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, in 1941, a
California statute that imposed a criminal penalty for transporting
an indigent into the state was unanimously struck down as an in-
fringement on the exercise of the right to travel.' Moreover, as
evidenced by its invalidation of a $1 per passenger tax levied by Ne-
vada upon interstate common carriers,2 the Supreme Court has re-
fused to tolerate restrictions on the right to travel even where the
deterrent effect is slight.
In the recent case of Shapiro v. Thompson,3 the Court again con-
sidered the constitutionality of statutes whose provisions allegedly
deterred the free movement of individuals between states. At issue
were the 1-year residency requirements imposed by Connecticut, 4 the
I Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
2 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
3 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Shapiro is a combination of several similar cases from
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania. For a synopsis of the facts of
each case, see note 9 infra.
4 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2c (Supp. 1969), formerly § 17-2d (Supp. 1967),
provides:
When any person comes into this state without visible means of support for
the immediate future and applies for aid to dependent children under chapter
302 or general assistance under part I of chapter 308 within one year from
his arrival, such person shall be eligible only for temporary aid or care until
arrangements are made for his return, provided ineligibility for aid to depen-
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District of Columbia,"' and Pennsylvania' as a condition for welfare
eligibility. Unlike some previous legislative attempts to burden in-
terstate travel, the statutes under attack in Shapiro exacted no direct
penalty from an indigent entering or residing in the state. Never-
theless, by denying access to public assistance for 1 year, the statutes
had the effect of discouraging an indigent from leaving a state
where he qualified for financial aid. The majority observed that the
challenged statutes classified all welfare applicants into two groups,
distinguishable only by their length of residence. Applicants who
had lived within the state for less than 1 year were denied the bene-
fit of permanent public assistance.7  Affirming the decisions of three
federal district courts,' the Supreme Court held that residency re-
quirements which precluded otherwise eligible applicants from ob-
taining either Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or
dent children shall not continue beyond the maximum federal residence re-
quirement.
5 D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (Supp. V, 1966), provides in part:
Public assistance shall be awarded to or on behalf of any needy individual
who either (a) has resided in the District for one year immediately preceding
the date of filing his application for such assistance; or (b) who was born
within one year immediately preceding the application for such aid, if the par-
ent or other relative with whom the child is living has resided in the District
for one year immediately preceding the birth; or (c) is otherwise within one of
the categories of public assistance established by this chapter .
6 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432(6) (1968) provides:
Assistance may be granted only to or in behalf of a person residing in Pennsyl-
vania who (i) has resided therein for at least one year immediately preceding
the date of application; (ii) last resided in a state which, by law, regulation or
reciprocal agreement with Pennsylvania, grants public assistance to or in behalf
of a person who has resided in such state for less than one year; (iii) is a mar-
ried woman residing with a husband who meets the requirement prescribed in
subclause (i) or (ii) of this clause; or (iv) is a child less than one year of age
whose parent, or relative with whom he is residing, meets the requirement pre-
scribed in subclause (i), (ii) or (iii) of this clause or resided in Pennsylvania for
at least one year immediately preceding the child's birth. Needy persons who
do nor meet any of the requirements stated in this clause and who are transients
or without residence in any state, may be granted assistance in accordance with
rules, regulations, and standards established by the department.
7 In each case the welfare applicants met the test for residence in their jurisdictions;
howcver, they did not meet the length of residence required for welfare assistance. 39-
U.S. at 627.
8 Basing the right to travel on the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th
amendment, the lower court in Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn.
1967), held that the 1-year residency requirement for welfare applicants was uncon-
stitutional as an abridgement of the right to interstate travel and a denial of equal pro-
tection. Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967), struck down the residencY
requirement of the District of Columbia because the court could find no reasonable
purpose served by it. In Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967), the
court could find no purpose for a residency requirement except that the state was attelt-
ing to exclude indigents. Such a purpose was clearly improper because it imposed a
barrier to the exercise of the right of interstate travel, a right described b, the court as
"inherent in the notion of a unified nation." Id. at 68.
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Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled constituted a burden
upon the right to free interstate travel. Because appellants could
offer no governmental purpose for the residency requirements suf-
ficiently compelling to warrant interference with a constitutional
right, the Court held that the statutes violated the equal protection
clause of the 14th amendment.
Statutes challenged under the equal protection clause have tradi-
tionally been upheld by the Supreme Court provided they are
founded upon a reasonable basis.10 However, when exercise of a
fundamental right is discouraged or prevented through legislative
classification, such statutes will be upheld only if the state meets the
increased burden of showing a compelling governmental interest.
9 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969). Appellee Thompson, an unwed
mother of one child and unable to work because of pregnancy, moved from Massachu-
setts to Connecticut in June 1966 to live with her mother. Two months later, Miss
Thompson applied for and was denied AFDC because she had not fulfilled the 1-year
residency requirement imposed by Connecticut on persons entering the state without
visible means of support. Appellee Harrell, after moving from New York to Washing-
ton, D.C., was denied welfare eligibility until she had resided in the District for 1 year.
Pregnant and in ill health, appellee Legrant was denied AFDC for herself and her two
children when she moved from South Carolina to the District of Columbia to live with a
brother and sister. Moving from Arkansas to Washington, D.C., where she had lived as
a child, appellee Brown and her two children were unable 'to obtain financial aid. Ap-
pellee Barley had entered the District of Columbia in March 1941, and was committed
1 month later to a mental hospital where she remained for 15 years. Because the time
spent in the hospital did not count toward fulfilling the residency requirement, appellee
Barley could not be released to a foster home, since such an arrangement depended on
her receiving Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. Pennsylvania, meanwhile,
was denying aid on the basis of unfulfilled residency requirements to appellee Smith and
her five children, who had moved from Delaware to Pennsylvania in order to live with
her father, and to appellee Foster and her four children who had left Pennsylvania in
1965 and returned in 1967. 394 U.S. at 621-27.
Although the fifth amendment contains no explicit equal protection clause, the
Court applies the fifth amendment due process clause to discriminatory congressional
action in much the same way it applies the 14th amendment equal protection clause to
state action. When the Court struck down state" segregation of public schools in Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as violative of the equal protection clause of
the 14th amendment, it used the due process clause of the fifth amendment to outlaw
congressionally imposed segregation in the District of Columbia, commenting that such
segregation amounted to discrimination "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due pro-
cess." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954).
10 The traditional test for validity of a statute which classifies state citizens into
groups for purposes of separate treatment is the reasonable basis test - the state must
show that the classification was created not arbitrarily, but for a reason. Almost any
reason will do. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1941) (statute forbidding advertising vehicles on the street, but excepting from this
prohibition vehicles carrying advertising of the business of the owner, upheld); Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (affirming state antitrust laws that excluded farmers for
the reason that they were traditionally independent and not likely subject to illegal or-
ganization); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) (affirming
on the ground of administrative convenience a statute which taxed only employers of
eight or more persons).
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Before concluding that a constitutionally protected, fundamental
right had been improperly infringed, the Shapiro Court examined the
source and the nature of the right to travel in order to select the ap-
plicable standard under which to test the validity of the residency re-
quirements.
Because the right to travel is not explicitly mentioned in the Con-
stitution," there has been frequent disagreement as to the source of
the right. The privileges and immunities clause of article IV,' 2 the
privileges and immunities clause of the 14th amendment," the com-
merce clause,' 4 and the due process clause of the fifth amendment '
1 See Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION 185 (1968),
wherein the author suggests two possible reasons for the omission. First, the Drafters
may not have wished to include special protection for this right; second, the Drafters be-
lieved it to be encompassed elsewhere in the Constitution. In light of the Drafters' ulti-
mate ban on state tariffs, it is unlikely that they would have allowed states to restrict
"free ingress and egress" of persons. The second interpretation seems, therefore, the
more reasonable. See New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 12 (1959) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
12Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823),
was the first judicial recognition of the right to travel, wherein this right was character-
ized, in dictum, as one of the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens under
article IV. Although this characterization of the right to travel was confirmed in Ward
v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871), article IV is generally interpreted
not as granting any privileges of national citizenship, but rather as preventing a state
from discriminating against citizens from other states in favor of its own citizens. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 666 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77
(1873).
13 Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Bradley, dissenting in the Slaughter-Houses
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 97, 116 (1873), analogized to the interpretation of the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No.
3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), and contended that the 14th amendment's privileges and
immunities clause was intended to protect the rights of national citizens against state
intrusion.
Concurring in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), Justices Douglas, Black,
Murphy, and Jackson hesitated to ascribe the freedom of travel to the commerce clause
as the majority did and maintained that the movement of persons should occupy a more
protected position within the 14th amendment that the movement of things.
One author has observed that reliance on the 14th amendment leads to the unlikely
conclusion that the Constitutional Convention did not intend to preserve the "free in-
gress and egress" clause of the Articles of Confederation. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 11, at
190-91. See 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1119 (3d ed. 1965),
wherein the author argues that shortly after its enactment, the 14th amendment's priv-
ileges and immunities clause was rendered completely useless by the failure of the major-
ity of the Court to apply it in the Slaughter-House Cases, and thereafter to any case
which has been before the Court since its enactment, except in one case since overruled.
14 In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), a majority of five justices held
that passage from state to state was protected from state interference by the commerce
clause. For a discussion of Edwards in relation to Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissenting
opinion in Shapiro, see note 18 infra. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), the Court
affirmed the power of Congress to remove obstructions to interstate travel resulting from
discrimination by restaurant and motel owners.
- 15 Since the commerce clause places no restrictions on Congress and the 14th amend-
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at various times have been held to be the source of the right. In spite
of this disagreement as to the exact source of the right, the Court has
been overwhelmingly in agreement that the right to travel is at least
a constitutionally guaranteed right.'" The majority and two dissent-
ing opinions in Shapiro similarly reflect this notion of a constitu-
tional right and also echo the historical conflict over the source.
That the right to travel was grounded on the commerce clause
seemed evident to Mr. Chief Justice Warren in his dissenting opin-
ion, and therefore conclusory of the applicable standard by which to
judge the challenged statutes." Because the commerce clause em-
powers Congress to impose any reasonable regulatory scheme on in-
terstate commerce, a rational statute providing for residency require-
ments could constitutionally impose some limitation on travel.'"
ment does not apply to Congress, the Court has based freedom to travel on the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment in order to scrutinize congressionally imposed re-
strictions on leaving the United States. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
26 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966); New York v. O'Neill, 359
U.S. 1, 12-16 (1959) (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 97 (1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849).
1T Acting pursuant to the commerce clause, Congress can impose any regulatory
scheme, provided there exists a rational basis for the scheme promotive of interstate
commerce. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964). Mr. Chief Justice
Warren viewed section 402(b) of the Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 402(b),
49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1964), as manifesting a con-
gressional intent to encourage states to concentrate their resources on welfare programs,
thereby improving the collective lot of welfare recipients and ultimately resulting in in-
creased interstate commerce. That section provides:
The Secretary (of Health, Education and Welfare] shall approve any Estate as-
sistance) plan which fulfills the conditions specified in subsection (a) of this
section, except that he shall not approve any plan which imposes as a condition
of eligibility for aid to families with dependent children, a residence require-
ment which denies aid with respect to any child residing in the State (1) who
has resided in the State for one year immediately preceding the application for
such aid, or (2) who was born within one year immediately preceding the ap-
plication, if the parent or other relative with whom the child is living has re-
sided in the State for one year immediately preceding the birth.
While the majority position maintained that the 1-year residency requirement of
section 402(b) was designed to deter states from imposing lengthy residency require-
ments, the Chief Justice interpreted the legislative history as evincing a congressional
intent to authorize residency requirements of up to 1 year. Thus, each challenged stat-
ute in Shapiro was either congressionally enacted or authorized. The majority com-
mented that if the constitutionality of section 402(b) wdre at issue the 1-year requirement
therein would be unconstitutional because Congress cannot authorize the states to vio-
late the equal protection clause. In reply, Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated: "The Court,
after interpreting the legislative history in such a manner that the constitutionality of
§ 402(b) is not at issue, gratuitously adds that § 402(b) is unconstitutional." 394 U.S.
at 653.
I8 The majority in Shapiro chose not to deal with the question of the extent of con-
gressional power to regulate travel if the source of the right is found in the commerce
clause as suggested in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). While Edwards
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In a separate dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan, while agree-
ing that the right to travel was "fundamental," rejected the major-
ity's application of a compelling interest test to the challenged stat-
utes. Locating the source of the right in the due process clause of
the fifth amendment, he concluded that this provision adequately
immunized the right to travel from congressionally enacted or au-
thorized state infringements without the necessity of expanding the
use of the compelling interest test. His consistent position has been
to limit application of a compelling interest test to racial classifica-
tions that deny equal protection. Thus, a rational state purpose for
the residency requirements would justify any reasonable statutory re-
striction on freedom of travel.19
indicated that Congress could regulate the travel of individuals between states, the Court
did not pass upon the scope of such power. See id. at 176. One cannot discount the
possibility that freedom to travel exists as a fundamental personal liberty independent
of the commerce clause. Edwards employed the latter as a protection of the free flow
of persons, in treatment similar to the protection given free movement of goods, rather
than speaking in terms of the right to travel as a personal freedom. Thus, while
movement of persons constitutes part of the flow of interstate commerce which is pro-
tected from state interference by the commerce clause, travel may also, as the majority
in Shapiro decided, merit a higher level of protection from both state and national en-
croachments because of its fundamental nature inferred from the constitutional scheme
of government.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren did not rely on the Edwards case as authority for his posi-
tion that the commerce clause is the source of freedom to travel, noting that it is inap-
plicable because it deals with state-imposed rather than congressionally-imposed re-
strictions. Instead he based his conclusion on two types of previously upheld congres-
sional restrictions on interstate travel: safety regulations imposed on interstate carriers
and criminal penalties for crossing state lines for criminal purposes. To support his
argument the Chief Justice cited Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (Con-
gress may require that railroads comply with safety regulations prescribed for railroad
cars used in interstate commerce, whether or not the cars are actually in use at the time of
the violation), and United States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 915 (1965) (Congress may lawfully restrict the crossing of state borders for criminal
purposes). Perhaps because the purpose of these restrictions was to promote public
safety - an interest which is usually compelling [see notes 30-33 infra & accompanying
text) - and because he applied the reasonable basis rather than the compelling interest
test, Mr. Chief Justice Warren mustered further authority for Congress power to regu-
late interstate travel. He found authority in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), for
balancing the extent of the restriction on travel against the necessity for the imposition
of the restriction, and concluded that Congress reasonable basis for the imposition of
residency requirements (to encourage states to enter the federal welfare program, thereby
increasing the scope of the benefits) outweighed any deterrent effect such requirements
may have had on freedom to travel. 394 U.S. 618, 649-50. The Zemel Court based
the right to travel on the fifth amendment due process clause, since the congressional
restriction was not on interstate travel, but rather involved refusal of the Secretary of
State, as authorized by Congress, to grant passports for foreign travel. It is somewhat
curious that the Chief Justice relied upon Zemel to justify the application of a rational
basis test to the statutes, since, as the majority's spokesman in Zemel, his language there
suggested the application of a compelling state interest test where restrictions on free
travel were involved. 381 U.S. at 15-16.
19 394 U.S. at 671. Mr. Justice Harlan put the word "fundamental" in quotation
marks, suggesting that while he believed that the right to travel freely is fundamental
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The majority, citing United States v. Guest20 as authority for the
proposition that the right to travel is fundamental to our scheme of
federalism, did not search for a specific source within the Constitu-
tion, but proceeded directly to apply a compelling interest test to the
statutes in question." Examining all reasons and interests offered
by the states, the majority found that the purposes were impermis-
sible,22 irrational, -3 too drastic although valid, 4 or were spurious, in-
in the usual meaning of the adjective, he did not wish to use the word in the sense that
its use automatically required a showing of compelling state interest to justify a statute
inhibiting the right. Mr. Justice Harlan has consistently maintained that wholesale in-
validation of state statutes may occur if the Court requires a higher purpose for state
legislation where it affects fundamental rights. See Harper v. Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 683-86 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting), wherein the Court struck down a
Virginia poll tax on state elections because it encroached upon the fundamental right of
voting. Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that he would have joined the majority in apply-
ing the stricter test had racial discrimination resulting from the poll tax been found by
the Court. For Mr. Justice Harlan's interpretation of the 14th amendment based on
its historical origins, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).
20 383 U.S. 745 (1966). In that case, appellees were indicted under section 241 of
the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964), on several
charges, including interference with the right of Negro citizens to engage freely in inter-
state travel by restricting them from free use of the streets and highways of Georgia.
In reversing the lower courtes dismissal of this charge, the Court characterized freedom
to travel as a fundamental constitutional right. This case may be distinguished from
Shapiro, however, because it involved restrictions placed on travel by individuals rather
than by Congress. The extent of Congress power to regulate travel under different
sections of the Constitution was, therefore, not a question facing the Court in Guest
when it decided there was no need to identify the source of the right. 383 U.S. at 757-58.
21 The Court occasionally has read into the Constitution rights which are not specif-
ically enumerated. This is particularly true where the Court, as in Shapiro, has employed
the equal protection clause in order to strike down discriminatory statutes. In Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), for example, the Court stated that a statute permit-
ting sterilization of habitual criminal offenders, but excluding embezzlers, tax evaders,
and political offenders, was subject to "strict scrutiny" because it deprived the offender
of the basic liberty to marry and have children - a liberty "fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541.
Where voting rights are curtailed, discriminatory classifications are also strictly
scrutinized. Recognition of voting rights as fundamental has been similar to the
Court's recognition of the right to travel. Existence of a right to vote has repeatedly
been inferred from the 15th and 19th amendments. E.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Fx parte Yarborough, 110
U.S. 651 (1883). On the basis of historical acceptance of voting as a fundamental right,
the Court, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), meticulously scrutinized Alabama's
apportionment procedures, in much the same manner as Skinner carefully examined
impairment of a sensitive area of human rights. Id. at 561-62. However, the Court
found the apportionment completely lacking in rationality and could have found it in-
valid on that basis alone. Id. at 568.
Thus, when laws infringe upon fundamental rights inferred from the Constitution,
ample precedent exists for requiring a state to satisfy the compelling interest test.
22Pennsylvania and Connecticut's principal justification - a need to protect the
state fiscal integrity from an influx of indigents - was dismissed as a dearly impermis-
sible consideration because a statute enacted to bar people from the state constitutes a
direct burden on freedom to travel. 394 U.S. at 629. Alternatively, the appellants
argued that the requirements served to exclude those indigents who would enter the
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asmuch as the state did not actually rely on the residency require-
ment for the suggested objective.2"
In fashioning their analyses the majority and dissenting Justices
drew upon concepts from the flexible body of law which has devel-
oped concerning the proper relationship of constitutional rights to
state interests. Those rights specifically enumerated in the Constitu-
tion, such as found in the first amendment,26 the fourth amendment
search and seizure clause,27 self-incrimination in the fifth,28 and the
sixth amendment right to counsel,2" historically have been viewed as
fundamental. Absent an overriding, compelling state interest there
is no justification for denying an individual or a class of people such
rights. In the area of public safety there is such a compelling inter-
est. The protection of the country from potential enemies during
wartime,30 the control of organizations notorious for acts of sub-
version and violence,3 1 and the protection of the public while on
state solely to obtain higher welfare benefits. The Court declared this objective to be
no more permissible than an attempt to exclude all indigents. Id. at 631.
23 The Court rejected Pennsylvania's alleged interest in encouraging the prompt
entry of indigents into the state labor force as being without a rational basis for impos-
ing a 1-year waiting period. Id. at 637-38.
24 While the Court agreed that prevention of fraud was a valid interest, there was
no need to use a 1-year waiting period when less drastic means were available to mini-
mize that hazard. Id. at 637. For similar reasoning, see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960), where the Supreme Court, in invalidating an Arkansas statute requiring
teachers to submit an annual affidavit listing all organizations to which they belonged,
stated:
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. Id. at 488 (footnote
omitted).
25 In spite of the claims that the residency requirement would aid in budget planning
and provide an objective method of testing bona fide residency, none of the appellants
had ever taken a census of new residents for future planning, nor had they utilized the
period as the sole criteria for determining residency since that was determined through
separate inquiry by welfare authorities. 394 U.S. at 634-36.
26 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion); De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931) (freedom of press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom
of speech).
27 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
28 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S..1 (1964).
29 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
30 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), wherein a statute en-
acted during World War II prohibiting United States citizens of Japanese descent from
residing in designated military areas was found to be justified as an emergency protec-
tion against sabotage.
3 1 Protecting the free flow of interstate commerce from disruption by violent politi-
cal strikes has been held to be a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to uphold
a statute requiring union officers to file affidavits that they are not Communists. Ameri-
can Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). State interest in gathering
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state property 2 are among those vital governmental interests wherein
regulations may permissibly infringe on individual rights. 3  On the
other hand, nonenumerated rights and privileges normally are pro-
tected only by the general prohibitions of the 14th amendment due
process and equal protection clauses. To comport with the require-
ments of equal protection, a state classification scheme granting or
denying benefits to a group of people traditionally has been justified
by a mere showing that it was not arbitrarily imposed. Ordinarily,
any reasonable basis will justify such a statute, especially in the area
of economic business classifications where the courts have been in-
dulgent toward proffered state interests.34
Between these conceptual poles exists an area where legislative
transgression of individual liberty may be apparent, but where no
constitutionally enumerated right has been violated. Within this
sphere lie certain statutory classifications, principally those based on
unalterable characteristics such as race and national origin, whose
inherently suspect nature necessitates the use of the compelling in-
terest test to guard against the probability of invidious discrimina-
tion. The Court has further held that classifications, not in them-
selves suspect, may result in the infringement of a nonenumerated
right so fundamental to constitutional concepts of liberty that the
same high degree of protection accorded enumerated, fundamental
rights is warranted. These two areas of inquiry constitute the two
branches of the compelling interest test as it is applied under the
equal protection clauseY5
information on Communist organizations outweighs the fundamental first amendment
right to association as long as the information sought bears a reasonable relationship to
the state purpose. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539
(1963). A state may validly require the Ku Klux Klan to submit a list of its rank and
file members because the organization is known for its acts of lawlessness. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
32 The Supreme Court has approved a statute requiring religious groups to obtain
a permit before holding ceremonies in a public park. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395 (1953). A New Hampshire statute requiring licensing of all parades, includ-
ing picket lines, was held constitutional in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
The Court's rationale in allowing these restrictions on first amendment rights was that
such statutes promote peace and convenience on public highways and parks. See
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (Mississippi validly exercised its police power
in enacting antipicketing laws designed to keep entrances and exits to public buildings
open and unobstructed).
33 Investigation of the competency of teachers has also been suggested as a com-
pelling state interest. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
3 4 See note 10 supra.
3 5 See Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618, 658-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
yhere Mr. Justice Harlan outlined the development of the two branches of the com-
pelling interest test. This test has been applied where the Court finds that statutorily
created classifications are inherently suspect. See note 39 iofra & accompanying text.
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Under the first branch of this test, statutory classifications can be
visualized on a spectrum, ranging from the inherently suspect cate-
gories of race, national origin, and wealth, through less strictly
scrutinized categories such as age and sex, down to normal business
classifications. Nonenumerated rights and privileges are similarly
scaled. The rights of procreation, suffrage, and, following Shapiro,
the right to travel, already held by the Court to require application of
the compelling interest test, head this scale, while business activities
occupy the lowest position. Between these extremes range rights
and benefits such as education, welfare, and the right to work, which
are accorded varying degrees of importance. Current pressures of
public interest and sentiment can, and do, vary the relative positions
of both the classifications and the rights. In Brown v. Board of
Education,6 the Court's reason for invalidating public school segre-
gation exemplifies the change in relative merit of a state-supported
benefit which has become, through shifting public attitude, a right
approaching the importance of a fundamental right. Observing that
education had assumed a role of paramount importance in preparing
a child for success in life, the Court declared that it had become ele-
vated to the status of a right, the equal enjoyment of which was
denied by segregation." Although the Brown Court did not con-
sider whether education is a fundamental right, the Court might, in
the future, so categorize it in view of today's necessity for educa-
tion .3
Using this dual approach to balancing individual rights against
state interests, the Court requires that the state show a compelling
interest where either rights or classifications or both are at the top
of their respective scales."9 Lower positions on both scales only re-
quire a state to meet the less stringent test of rationality. Such anal-
ysis can be found in Harper v. Board of Elections," where a clas-
sification by wealth restricting the right to vote was measured
The second area where the Court has required that the state meet the burden of showing
a compelling interest is where the classifications result in the denial of a fundamental
right. See note 21 supra.
36 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37 1d. at 492-93.
3 8 For a discussion of a similar change in the status of welfare, see note 44 infra.
3 9 When subjecting statutes to strict scrutiny in earlier equal protection cases, the
Court required that the states show an "overriding statutory purpose" (McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)], or a "pressing public necessity" [Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)], terms apparently synonymous with the test of compelling
state interest articulated in Shapiro.
40 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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against the state's interest in promoting intelligent voting. Analo-.
gizing classifications founded on wealth and property to racial clas-
sifications, the Court subjected a Virginia poll tax to strict scru-
tiny. Since the inevitable effect of the tax was to exclude indigents
from the polls, the Court struck down the tax on the ground that
wealth bore no relation to the voters' competence.4'
Cases also may arise where the classification, while not inher-
ently suspect, must nevertheless be strictly scrutinized because the
statute infringes on a fundamental right.-2 Acting pursuant to its
police power, for example, a state may have legitimate reasons for
classifying convicted criminals according to their crimes. In Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma,43 however, a classification exempting embezzlers,
political offenders, and the like from the sterilization inflicted on
habitual criminals, was strictly scrutinized by the Court to determine
whether the state had an "overriding state purpose" justifying inter-
ference with the fundamental right of procreation.
Once the state begins statutory classification outside the eco-
nomic sphere, the Court, in considering the validity of such statutes,
must attempt to balance state interests against individual rights and
liberties. On the side of personal rights and liberties, a variety of
factors may influence the Court to favor the individual. Using the
foregoing analysis, it would appear that the Shapiro majority did
more than merely elevate the right to travel to a preeminent position
that ,would require a compelling interest test. Although focus was
upon the fundamental right of travel, it is possible that the Shapiro
Court has impliedly included within this spectrum a right to a mini-
mum standard of living through welfare.44 These two rights would
4 1 Similarly, a racial classification and the denial of the fundamental rights of mar-
riage and procreation, unjustified by an overriding state purpose, prompted the Court
to invalidate Virginia's miscegenation statute. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
4 2 Occasionally a statute infringes upon two fundamental rights. In Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), prohibition on travel outside the United States
through denial of passports to known Communists violated both the right to travel and
the first amendment freedom of association. Although the government was acting in
the interests of national security, the Court would not tolerate this abridgement of
liberty, requiring that Congress find less drastic means to achieve its purpose. 378 U.S.
at 512-13.
In his dissent in Shapiro, Mr. Chief Justice Warren indicated his belief that state
interests were outweighed in Aptheker only because of the combined violation of two
fundamental rights. 394 U.S. at 649-50 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
43 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
44 The majority in Shapiro indicated that, like education, welfare may be rising on
the scale of human activities to a position where its denial by statutory classification will
constitute a significant factor in the Court's balancing technique. In holding that a dis-
crimination denying equal protection existed, the Court noted that the effect of the cas-
sification was that "the second class [was) denied welfare aid upon which may depend
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be sufficient for imposition of the stricter test of compelling interest,
rather than merely a showing of a rational basis."
The complexity of the balancing method of resolving equal pro-
tection controversies appears to necessitate a case by case analysis of
competing state interests and individual rights rather than the appli-
cation of a precise set of legal principles and definitions, thus rend-
ering somewhat speculative the outcome of future constitutional
challenges to state-imposed residency requirements.
46
As the majority suggests, the balance may at times weigh in favor
of the state." For example, where members of a profession are
obliged to meet certain requirements before obtaining a license to
practice within a state, the state is generally conceded to have more
at stake than administrative efficiency. The state interest in pro-
moting public safety may necessitate the use of residency require-
ments to insure that only qualified and competent professionals prac-
tice within the state.48  Balanced against this apparently compelling
interest is the theoretical infringement on the individual's right to
travel which results from any residency requirement. Although the
the abilities of the families to obtain the very means to subsist - food, shelter, and
other necessities of life." 394 U.S. at 627.
For additional discussion of the possible existence of a previously unrecognized right,
see Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L REV. 1127 (1969).
45 In dictum, the Court doubted that the appellants could even meet these lower
standards:
We conclude therefore that appellants in these cases do not use and have no
need to use the one-year requirement for the governmental purposes suggested.
Thus, even under traditional equal protection tests a dassification of welfare
applicants according to whether they have lived in the State for one year would
seem irrational and unconstitutional. 394 U.S. at 638 (footnoted omitted).
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, would take a more lenient view of the alleged gov-
ernmental interests. For example, although the states had not actually relied upon the
residency requirements for budget planning, such a purpose was reasonable. Id. at 673.
46 In American Commuters Ass'n v. Levitt, 279 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the
plaintiffs attempted to challenge all of New York's residency requirements, relying on
Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967). The court held that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the statutes because they were Connecticut
residents who merely worked and paid taxes in New York. The constititionality of the
resdiency requirements was never considered by the court.
47 The majority in Shapiro stated:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements
determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-fee education, to obtain
a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such re-
quirements may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on
the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right
of interstate travel. 394 U.S. at 638 n.21 (emphasis added).
4 8 See Pannam, Discrimination on the Basis of State Residence in Australia and the
United States, 6 MELBOURNE U.L. REv. 105, 128-29 (1967). Cf. Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960), wherein the Court acknowledged that a state has a vital con-
cern in the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools.
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Shapiro Court's suggestion that refusing welfare payments to new-
comers constitutes a deprivation of the necessities of life can be
weighed as a factor on the side of welfare recipients,49 it is doubtful
whether this suggestion can be construed to elevate the area of pro-
fessional licensing above the economic sphere, since a 1-year waiting
period ordinarily would not deprive the applicant of his entire means
of living. In this latter context, the state's case is strengthened by
the presentation of a significant interest in the residency require-
ment, while the individual's is weakened by the fact that his wel-
fare - a factor ancillary to the right to travel - is not entirely
jeopardized. Thus, the balance may shift in favor of the state.
In the area of voting, however, particularly where a presidential
election is at issue, the state may be unable to justify interference
with individual rights through residency requirements. Considera
tions in favor of the individual are formidable. Residency require-
ments force the individual to choose between two fundamental
rights - voting and the right to travel. If he wishes to vote the
individual must remain where he is qualified; by changing his resi-
dence, he must forfeit his right to vote until new residency require-
ments have been satisfied. While the creation of an informed local
electorate may constitute a sufficiently meritorious interest with re-
gard to state and local elections, this purpose has no logical applica-
tion to elections on a national level.50 However, in light of Shapiro,
even in local elections such a purpose may possibly justify only
minimal residency requirements when balanced against the dual in-
fringement of fundamental rights resulting from the requirements.
The leading case on residency requirements in presidential elec-
tions is Drueding v. Devlin,5 where the Supreme Court affirmed
per curiam a federal district court's holding that Maryland's resi-
dency requirements were reasonably enacted to facilitate voter iden-
tification and to prevent fraud. Since similar state justifications
were offered in Shapiro and subsequently dismissed, the future valid-
ity of residency requirements for voting appears rather doubtful in
spite of the majority's disclaimer of any views on the validity of such
requirements.52 The Court, however, recently declined an oppor-
49 394 U.S. at 627. Although the majority merely adverted to the deprivation of
necessities, the implication is that such deprivation would be considered a factor aug-
menting the welfare recipient's case. See 394 U.S. at 655, 661 (Harlan J., dissenting).
GO Schnidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a Mo-
bile Society, 61 MICH. L REv. 823, 828 (1963).
51234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
5 2 See note 47 supra.
1970)
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 571
tunity to overrule Drueding and further undermine all state resi-
dency requirements. In Hall v. Beals,53 a Colorado statute requiring
residency of 6 months prior to voting in a presidential election had
been upheld in the state courts on the authority of Drueding. By
the time the case reached the Supreme Court, however, Colorado
had reduced its requirement from 6 to 2 months, thereby removing
the appellant from the class of voters disfranchised by the statute
and rendering the problem moot. 4
One of the most difficult interpretative problems facing the
courts is whether a statute that imposes residency requirements
upon students attending state supported universities is permissible
in light of Shapiro. The apparent state purpose in establishing
such requirements is to grant tuition benefits only to the state's tax-
payers and to prevent an influx of out-of-state students from im-
posing a drain on the state's educational facilities. Since virtually
the same state purposes were rejected in Shapiro because of the re-
strictions which the statutes imposed upon the right to travel, 5 it is
questionable whether such justifications would suffice in the area
of public education. It is plausible, however, that some of the alter-
native state interests advanced in Shapiro might be given greater
weight when presented as justifications for residency requirements
in the area of education, particularly where they are actually relied
upon as an objective test of residence and where the detriment re-
suiting from infringement on free travel is less than where welfare
is denied. The need to qualify immediately for low-cost education
is so lacking in exigency that its denial may result in no real burden
on interstate travel. 56 Opposing the state's interests, however, is
not only the suppositional violation of free travel, but also the in-
dividual's interest in obtaining a college education. The right to
an education, at least at the lower levels, was considered significant
53 396 U.S. 45 (1969).
5 4 Mr. Justice Brennan dissented, noting that Colorado's 2-month requirement was
too short to ever permit a voter to reach the High Court while he was still disfranchised.
Id. at 51. In a separate dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Marshall declared that the
Court should have relaxed the traditional rules of moomess in order to have a vehicle
by which to overrule the erroneous application of the reasonable basis test in Drueding.
Id. at 51-52.
5 5 See notes 22-25 supra.
56 Such an argument is suggested by Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F.
Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967), where the court examined the quality of the privilege rather
than the degree of state interest served by the residency requirements. The Green court
held insufficient, for purposes of welfare, state interests previously held suffident to
justify residency requirements for voting. Attempting to resolve this inconsistency, the
court stated that "the need for food, clothing, and lodging has an aspect of immediacy
which differentiates it in kind from the right to vote." Id. at 178.
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in Brown v. Board of Education." Whether, in view of shifting
cultural priorities, the necessity for higher education has increased
to such a degree as to be considered an important or fundamental
right remains an open question.
In an era of prolonged and spiraling inflation indigents may not
be capable of changing their status. Shapiro reflects not only the
High Court's diligence in safeguarding a historic right to travel but
also its sensitivity to current social problems and rights or privileges
closely tied to travel. Whether this is the role of the judicial or
legislative branch is debatable, but certainly Shapiro portends further
changes in other areas of residency requirements.
KAREN HAMmERSTROm
57 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
